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CORRESPONDENCE 
Way Beyond Candor 
Gail Heriot* 
Scott Altman's excellent article, Beyond Candor, 1 causes me to 
pose this query: Does his theory contain not only the seeds of its own 
rejection, but perhaps also (if I am not careful) the seeds of the rejec-
tion of its rejection? 
Altman tells us of the orthodox view that judges should be en-
couraged to be both honest with the public and honest with themselves 
about how they arrive at their decisions. Through this combination of 
public candor and critical introspection, judges will produce better ju-
dicial opinions and ultimately a better legal system, or so the argument 
runs. 
Altman rejects the orthodox view at least insofar as it encourages 
critical introspection among judges. Significantly, however, he does 
not directly attack the underlying values embodied in it. He does not 
attack the virtues of candor at all - either in the specific context of 
judicial opinions or more generally. Nor does he attack introspection 
in general. He appears willing to accept the notion that critical exami-
nation of one's own motivations and beliefs is beneficial. His sole at-
tack is on the particular case of introspection in judicial 
decisionmaking. He thus appears to be arguing for an exception for 
judicial decisionmaking to a moral precept that he otherwise has no 
particular quarrel with - that critical self-examination is valuable 
and should be encouraged or, more generally, that the pursuit of truth 
is valuable and ought to be encouraged. 
Altman's argument runs this way: Judges tend to overestimate the 
extent to which their decisions are the product of constraint imposed 
upon them by the law. In many instances, they deceive themselves 
into believing that they are acting under constraint of law when in fact 
they are acting according to their own personal preferences. In some 
of these cases, the judge is simply mistaken as to the reach of the law. 
The law actually may impose no constraint upon the judge at all. In 
other cases, the error is more serious. The law would have been inter-
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preted by most to constrain the judge to reach a result contrary to the 
one she reached - a constraint the judge blithely ignores. 
Altman regards this self-deception as beneficial. He fears that cor-
recting it may have a serious perverse consequence, in that judges' 
newly enlightened views on the degree to which their decisions are the 
product of constraint in the law may operate as a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. For example, if a previously self-deceiving judge learns that she 
has been mistaken about her faithfulness to the rule of law, she may 
become not simply chastened but thoroughly disillusioned. Previ-
ously, she had unwittingly strayed from legal constraint only on rare 
occasions when her personal preferences were particularly strong. 
Her self-deception permitted her to arrive at conclusions she was hell-
bent on arriving at anyway, without affecting her devotion to the rule 
of law in other cases. Recognizing her faithlessness may not make her 
any more likely than before to submit herself to the law's constraint in 
those cases in which she strongly objects to the outcome dictated by 
law. Instead, once she realizes that she has already tasted forbidden 
fruit, she may find it easier to do so again in the future, even in cases 
where her quarrel with the otherwise applicable rule is trivial. Indeed, 
she may even adopt a new judicial philosophy that purports to legiti-
mize absolute discretion on the part of judges to decide cases as they 
wish.2 
Similarly, Altman argues that another judge who previously 
searched diligently for constraint in the law might search less dili-
gently if she learns that there is less constraint than she had thought. 
Indeed, such a judge may adopt the opposite practice, searching dili-
gently for ambiguities or inconsistencies in the law. Over time, this 
too will tend to reduce the level of constraint imposed by the law, for 
such constraint requires some consensus on the meaning of legal rules 
and standards. The more aggressively judges seek the ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, the more rapid the deterioration of consensus, and 
hence of legal constraint. 3 
Altman would not welcome such a decrease in legal constraint. 
He makes it quite clear that he believes the legal system would be 
worse off if it were to become less constraining than it is now. 
Although he recognizes the costs of constraining legal rules, he has no 
trouble pointing out their virtues: 
If judges follow law, rather than doing in each case what seems to them 
best, many difficulties are minimized. Decisions are more predictable, 
offering notice to potential litigants, permitting planning, deterring liti-
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gation, and promoting stability. If the applicable law was established by 
a legislature or by many judges over time, following law limits the power 
of individual judges, promoting the values of decisionmaking by consen-
sus. Finally, if judges hold views aberrant from or unacceptable to the 
community, constraining judges limits the implementation of unaccept-
able values. 4 
Rather than risk a decrease in the law's constraint, Altman counsels 
caution in revealing truth to judges or even in encouraging judges to 
find the truth in themselves. 
The curious aspect of Altman's argument is this: It concerns itself 
solely with the importance of judicial decisionmaking rules and ne-
glects entirely the importance of other kinds of rules. If one views 
nonlegal decisionmaking heuristics, such as "Seek the truth," as rules 
that ought to carry with them a power to constrain similar to that of 
legal rules, Altman's argument undermines itself. In an effort to pro-
tect legal constraint in judicial decisionmaking from deterioration and 
decay, Altman - without explanation - sacrifices moral constraint. 
It is easy to see why Altman is anxious to preserve constraint in 
judicial decisionmaking. A legal rule that commands the judge to 
"dismiss any lawsuit not brought within three years of the date the 
cause of action arose" may well, under certain circumstances, be pref-
erable to a rule that commands the judge to "dismiss any lawsuit not 
brought within three years of the date the cause of action arose unless, 
all things considered, that is not the best thing to do." Despite the fact 
that the latter formulation may be a better reflection of our abstract 
notions of perfect justice, the former, more rigid formulation may 
work better in practice. Adopting the more constraining formulation 
may prevent judges with views that are aberrant from the community 
from imposing their views on the community. The judge who dis-
agrees fundamentally with the community's basic limitations policy 
and the reasons for it will not have the same opportunity to circum-
vent that policy that she would have if the more discretionary rule 
were imposed upon her. There is a price to pay for this protection 
against aberrant judges - a price paid in terms of unwanted rigidity in 
the law - but sometimes this will be a price worth paying. None of 
this is meant to suggest that the more rigid formulation is or should be 
absolutely constraining. Although reasonable persons may disagree as 
to the weight of the presumption in favor of the application of any 
particular rule, few would dispute that in some circumstances the pre-
sumption (and thus the rule) should be overridden (for example, occa-
sions in which application of the rule would result in the destruction of 
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the universe). The point here is simply that some constraint in the law 
is beneficial, and the more rigid formulation offers more constraint on 
the judge than the more flexible and discretionary formulation. 
Culturally imposed moral codes are no different. Such precepts as 
"Be honest," "Work hard," and "Seek the truth" are drilled into chil-
dren from an early age. Few parents tell their children, "Exercise 
your own discretion in determining when it is appropriate to be hon-
est," "Work hard when it appears, all things considered, to be the 
appropriate thing to do," or "Seek the truth when you determine it 
wise." The reason is clear: these moral codes are meant to have their 
element of constraint as well. Just as the community benefits from its 
ability to prevent judges with aberrant or unacceptable views from de-
ciding a case based on them, the community benefits from the ability 
to prevent moral actors with aberrant or unacceptable views from act-
ing on their views. Some level of constraint is crucial. 
Why shouldn't the same analysis Altman uses in discussing the 
circumstances under which legal rules should be overridden be applied 
to moral rules? He appears to adopt the method of analysis that Fred-
erick Schauer has called presumptive positivism5 in analyzing when a 
legal rule should be overridden by other concerns. 6 According to Alt-
man, a presumptive positivist follows a rule unless the expected out-
come from the application of that rule appears very wrong. In that 
case, she engages in an all-things-considered analysis (including con-
sideration of such rule values as predictability and uniformity) to de-
termine if the rule should be followed. On the other hand, if the 
expected outcome strikes the presumptive positivist as only somewhat 
wrong, she will apply the rule. 
Would a presumptive positivist dealing with the moral precept 
"Seek the truth" find sufficient reason in Beyond Candor to overcome 
the presumption in favor of the moral precept in the context of judicial 
decisionmaking? In other words, would the presumptive positivist 
find the result occasioned by following the "Seek the truth" rule to be 
"very wrong," such that she would consider overriding it? It seems 
entirely possible that the answer is "no." 
To begin with, the evidence of potential loss of legal constraint is 
entirely speculative. Altman is tentative in his empirical conclusions 
and rightly so. We cannot be sure how judges will react if they learn, 
through introspection or otherwise, that they are less constrained in 
their decisionmaking than they previously thought. Perhaps Altman 
S. Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 1991). 
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is correct that they will react in such a way as to reduce the overall 
level of constraint in the law. The contrary conclusion, however, is 
just as plausible. Judges who learn the hidden truth may well react by 
attempting to increase the constraint imposed by law. A judge who 
finds that she has been faithless to a rule of law may firmly resolve not 
to behave that way in the future. A judge who previously believed 
herself to be acting under constraint oflaw, but who learns that this is 
not so, may become dismayed over that lack of constraint. Such a 
judge may react by refusing to look quite so hard for ambiguities and 
conflicts in the law in the future. Over time, this could create a cli-
mate of increased consensus and hence increased constraint. 
Second, even if the evidence were irrefutable that encouraging 
judges to introspect would result in decreased legal constraint, it is not 
at all clear that a sufficient basis would exist to override the precept. 
We are, after all, discussing the prime directive of academic life and a 
vitally important rule of civilized life in general: Seek and disseminate 
the truth. Loss of some legal constraint may be a small price to pay to 
protect the constraint imposed by the rule from deterioration. 
Thus, the presumptive positivist's response to Altman's argument 
may well be to disregard it insofar as it recommends a deviation from 
the rule "Seek and disseminate the truth." Although stimulating, the 
article may present an insufficient foundation upon which to base such 
a deviation. 
Of course, I am not arguing that Altman's argument presents a 
threat to moral constraint and hence should not have been written at 
all. If I were to suggest such a thing, surely I would be open to the 
same criticism I have made against Altman - a violation without ade-
quate justification of the moral precept "Seek and disseminate the 
truth." Instead, I argue solely that his warnings should not be acted 
upon. 
Altman, by his own lights, should appreciate the need for con-
straint imposed upon moral decisionmakers by moral rules just as he 
recognizes the need for constraint imposed upon judges by legal rules. 
Specifically, as a supporter of legal constraint, he should recognize 
that the moral precept "Seek and disseminate the truth" should be 
followed except in those relatively rare circumstances in which one 
can argue persuasively that the application of the rule will yield a 
"very wrong" result. Altman has failed to demonstrate that such a 
circumstance exists in the context of judicial decisionmaking. 
